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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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____________ 
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____________ 
 
COREY L. HARRIS,  
CH’S Service Provider and Children,   
C.H., Jr., B.H., A.H., 
                                      Appellant  
      
v. 
 
GREATER ERIE COUNTY ACTION COMMITTEE;  
 GEGAC EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION  
DIVISION WORKFORCE 2001; PENNSYLVANIA  
CAREER LINK WORKFORCE; ERIE COUNTY ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING; ERIE COUNTY  
ASSISTANCE OFFICE; S.P. BLACK & ASSOCIATES 
 
 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-04-cv-00281) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti   
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 12, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 25, 2016) 
____________ 
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OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Corey L. Harris appeals from orders of the District Court denying his 
motion to reopen the judgment and motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 Harris originally filed a civil action in September 2004 in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against numerous defendants, 
including the Greater Erie Community Action Committee, the Pennsylvania Career Link 
Workforce, and S.P. Black & Associates.  Harris alleged that the defendants, in the 
course of assisting him in applying for grant money to operate a transportation service for 
low-income workers, misappropriated his trade secrets and created a similar 
transportation service.  The defendants moved to dismiss Harris’ amended complaint, 
and, in an order entered on March 10, 2006, the motions were granted by U.S. District 
Judge Sean J. McLaughlin, who was then assigned to the matter. 
 On January 18, 2012, almost six years after the case was closed, Harris filed his 
first motion to reopen pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  He appeared to 
allege that the defendants had done something improper in connection with his state court 
child support proceedings that had interfered with the litigation of this federal lawsuit.  
The Rule 60(b) motion was denied.  Second and third Rule 60(b) motions to reopen were 
filed and denied. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent 
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 At issue in this appeal, on September 3, 2015, Harris filed a fourth Rule 60(b) 
motion to reopen the 2006 judgment in this matter.  He alleged that his motion was based 
on newly discovered evidence, and asserted that Judge McLaughlin, who had since 
resigned from the judiciary, should have recused himself because he had labored under a 
conflict of interest, the conflict being that he allegedly owned stock in Erie Insurance 
Company which insures Harris’ competitor, Uber.  In an order entered on February 9, 
2016, the District Court, after questioning the plausibility of the allegations given that 
Uber was not founded until well after Harris’ lawsuit was dismissed, denied the Rule 
60(b) motion as untimely filed.  On February 16, 2016, Harris filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which the District Court denied as meritless in an 
order entered on May 3, 2016. 
 Harris timely appeals.1  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Harris 
appears to suggest in his brief that his new evidence was only uncovered after a ten-year 
investigation.  Appellant’s Informal Brief, at 8.  Moreover, he asserts that he invented 
Uber, UberX and Lyft, id. at 3, and that Erie County’s infringement on his “U.S. Trade 
Mark” warrants our reversing the District Court, id. at 11.   
We will affirm.  We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of 
Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999).  “The general purpose of Rule 60 . . . is to 
                                              
1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) tolls the running of the 30-day 
appeal period when a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is filed 
within 28 days after entry of the judgment.  Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 278-
79 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought 
to an end and that justice must be done.”  Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Education & 
Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).   
Rule 60(b)(2) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request 
reopening of his case, where there is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b).”  Although newly discovered evidence thus is a valid basis for seeking to reopen 
the judgment, Harris’ motion to reopen was untimely filed because such claims must be 
brought within one year after the entry of judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (“A motion 
under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time – and for reasons (1), (2), and 
(3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the 
proceeding.”).   
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a party to seek relief from judgment upon a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances.  See Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 
908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977).  Harris has not shown extraordinary circumstances, and, 
although claims falling under Rule 60(b)(6) are not subject to the one-year limitation 
period, they must still be brought “within a reasonable time,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).  A 
Rule 60 motion filed more than nine years after the final judgment which fails to offer an 
adequate explanation for the delay, is not brought within a reasonable time.  See 
Moolenaar v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (two years not 
reasonable); Martinez-McBean, 562 F.2d at 913 n.7 (doubting that two and one-half year 
delay would comply with “reasonable time” requirement).  We have fully considered the 
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arguments Harris raises in his Informal Brief, but they do not persuade us that his case 
involves extraordinary circumstances. 
Harris’ motion for reconsideration was properly denied by the District Court 
because he did not argue an intervening change in the law, new evidence, or the need to 
correct a clear error of law.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  
       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court denying 
Harris’ Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the judgment and motion for reconsideration. 
